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1. Introduction    
Together with firms and the government, individuals (households) are one of the three major 
economic agents in any economy, but there is surprisingly little agreement about which model of 
household behavior applies in the real world.  For example, are individuals selfish, caring only about 
themselves, or are they altruistic, caring not only about themselves but also about their children, other 
family members, and perhaps even about complete strangers?  Or are individuals primarily concerned 
about the perpetuation of the family line or the family business? 
In this paper, I briefly discuss three theoretical models of household behavior and show that they 
have very different implications for bequest motives and bequest division.  I then present a variety of 
evidence on bequest practices, on the strength and nature of bequest motives, on bequest division, on the 
willingness of individuals to help others, etc., for Japan and, where available, for the United States in order 
to shed light on which model of household behavior applies in the two countries. 
The issue of which model of household behavior applies in the real world is an important one 
because it has ramifications for what impact government policies have on the macroeconomy (e.g., for 
whether or not Ricardian equivalence holds in the real world) and for the extent to which wealth 
disparities are passed on from generation to generation.   
 The organization of this paper is as follows: In section 2, I discuss three theoretical models of 
household behavior with emphasis on their implications for bequest motives and bequest division; in 
section 3, I present historical evidence on bequest practices; in section 4, I describe the data sources used 
in my analysis; in sections 5 through 8, I present and discuss various data on bequest motives and bequest 
division; in section 9, I discuss data on individuals’ willingness to help others; in section 10, I discuss 
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more formal tests; in section 11, I summarize my findings; and in section 12, I discuss the policy 
implications of my findings. 
 
2. Theoretical Considerations    
There are at least three models of household behavior that are commonly used by 
economists—(1) the life cycle model,  (2) the altruism model, and (3) the dynasty (or lineal) model—and 
these models have very different implications for bequest motives and bequest division.  In this section, I 
discuss each of these models in turn with particular emphasis on their implications for bequest motives 
and bequest division (see Laitner (1997) and Masson and Pestieau (1997) for a more detailed survey of 
this literature). 
 
2.1. The Life Cycle Model  
The life cycle model of Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) assumes that individuals are selfish 
and that they derive utility only from their own consumption.  Thus, in a static setting, the utility function 
of parents will be as follows: 
 
),( ppp CUU =                                                                                                                 (1) 
 
where pU = the utility of parents  
            pC = the consumption of parents, 
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and parents will maximize their utility subject to the following budget constraint: 
 
pC pY≤ ,                                                                                                                            (2) 
 
where pY = the income of parents. 
 
Similarly, in a static setting, the utility function of children will be as follows: 
 
),( kkk CUU =                                                                                                                 (3) 
 
where kU = the utility of children 
kC = the consumption of children, 
 
and children will maximize their utility subject to the following budget constraint: 
 
 kk YC ≤ ,                                                                                                                          (4) 
 
where kY = the income of children. 
 
In other words, parents and children will behave totally independently of one another. 
In this simple form of the life cycle model, individuals will not leave any bequests at all to their 
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children because they derive no utility from their children’s utility.  However, at least three types of 
bequests are consistent with more sophisticated versions of the life cycle model. 
(1) Unintended, unplanned or accidental bequests arising from lifespan uncertainty.  
Uncertainty about one’s lifespan can lead even selfish individuals to leave considerable bequests under 
certain conditions, as shown by Levhari and Mirman (1977) and Davies (1981).  If annuity markets are 
perfect (i.e., actuarially fair annuities are available), individuals without a bequest motive will annuitize 
their entire wealth and thus will not leave any bequests at all regardless of when they die.  However, if 
actuarially fair annuities are not available and individuals are risk averse and cannot force their children to 
support them if and when they run out of assets (i.e., negative bequests are ruled out), lifespan uncertainty 
will cause individuals to save more than they would in a world with no lifespan uncertainty and cause 
those dying relatively young to leave considerable unintended, unplanned, or accidental bequests.  
  One variant of this type of bequest is unintended, unplanned, or accidental bequests arising from 
saving in preparation for uncertain medical and nursing care (long-term care) expenses in the future.  If 
actuarially fair medical and nursing care insurance is not available, individuals will save in preparation for 
medical and nursing care expenses during old age, and if it turns out that they do not incur such expenses 
or such expenses are not as high as expected, they will end up leaving considerable unintended, unplanned, 
or accidental bequests (see Kotlikoff (1989) re saving for medical expenses). 
(2) Bequests that are part of an implicit intra-family annuity contract.  If actuarially fair 
annuities are not available on the open market, even selfish individuals may choose to insure against the 
risk of an uncertain lifespan by concluding an implicit annuity contract with their children whereby their 
children agree to support them financially until they die in exchange for receiving a bequest when they die 
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(Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981).   
 One variant of this type of bequest is an intra-family “reverse mortgage” whereby the children 
agree to support their parents financially until they die in exchange for inheriting the family home. 
(3) Bequests that are a quid pro quo for care during old age (bequests arising from an 
exchange motive).  Even selfish individuals may conclude an agreement with their children whereby their 
children agree to take care of them during old age in exchange for receiving a bequest when they die, 
where care encompasses everything from phone calls, visits, and companionship to housework, shopping, 
transportation, and nursing care.  Individuals may choose to conclude such an agreement with their 
children if such services are not available on the open market, if such services are available on the open 
market but their prices are inflated, and/or if they prefer receiving such services from their children to 
receiving them from complete strangers (see Cox (1987)).   
 One variant of this type of bequest is bequests motivated by the strategic bequest motive of 
Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985).  In this model, individuals coerce their children into giving 
them attention (visits, care, etc.) by threatening to disinherit them if they fail to do so.  
 Note that there is a quid pro quo in the case of bequests of types (2) and (3) (financial support 
during old age in the case of (2) and care during old age in the case of (3)) and that individuals will not 
leave bequests of types (2) and (3) unless their children provide financial support and/or care during old 
age.  To put it another way, bequests of type (2) and (3) are ultimately used to finance one’s retirement 
because they are, in effect, delayed compensation for financial support and/or care during old age, and net 
bequests will not necessarily be positive because gross bequests from parents to children will be largely 
offset by transfers in the other direction (viz., financial support and/or care during old age that children 
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provide to their parents).  Note, moreover, that individuals will leave their entire bequest to the child who 
provides the financial support and/or care in the case of bequests of types (2) and (3). 
 
  2.2. The Altruism Model1   
The altruism model of Barro (1974) and Becker (1974, 1981, 1991) assumes that individuals 
harbor intergenerational altruism toward their children and that they derive utility not only from their own 
consumption but also from the utility of their children.  Thus, in a static setting, the utility function of 
parents will be as follows: 
 
[ ]),)(,( kkppp CUCUU ψ=                                                                                                 (5) 
 
where ψ = a positive monotonic transformation.2 
           
Parents will typically give transfers (inter vivos transfers as well as bequests) to their children because 
they harbor altruism toward them and derive utility from their utility.3  Thus, their budget constraint will 
be: 
 
 pp YTC ≤+ ,                                                                                                                       (6) 
 
where T = transfers from parents to children, 
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and they will maximize their utility subject to this budget constraint. 
 If we further assume that children do not harbor intergenerational altruism toward their parents 
(i.e., that altruism is one-sided), their utility function will be as follows: 
 
)( kkk CUU = ,                                                                                                                     (7) 
 
and children will maximize their utility subject to the following budget constraint: 
 
 TYC kk +≤ .                                                                                                                      (8) 
 
Barro (1974) and Becker (1974, 1981, 1991) show that, if children take their parents’ transfers as given, 
parents and children will act as if they are maximizing the parents’ utility function subject to the combined 
budget constraint: 
 
 Tkpkp YYYCC =+≤+ ,                                                                                                  (9) 
 
where =TY  total family income. 
 This model implies that individuals will leave a bequest to their children regardless of whether 
their children provide financial support to them and/or take care of them during old age, that bequests will 
be divided among their children, and that bequests will be compensatory (i.e., that individuals will give 
more to the child or children with less earnings capacity and/or greater consumption needs).  Note, 
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however, that even altruistic parents will not necessarily leave a bequest to their children if their children’s 
lifetime incomes are sufficiently greater than their own and/or if their degree of altruism is sufficiently 
low. 
 
2.3. The Dynasty (or Lineal) Model   
The dynasty or lineal model of Chu (1991) assumes that individuals are motivated by a desire to 
perpetuate the family line and/or the family business and hence that they will behave so as to minimize the 
probability of lineal or dynastic extinction.  Thus, this model implies that individuals will leave a bequest 
only if their children carry on the family line and/or the family business and that they will leave their entire 
bequest to the child or children who carry on the family life and/or the family business. 
 
 As I have shown, the three models of household behavior discussed above have very different 
implications concerning bequest motives and bequest division (see the summary in Table 1), and thus, data 
on bequest motives and bequest division can shed light on which model of household behavior holds in the 
real world.  In section 3, I present historical evidence on bequest practices in Japan, while in sections 5-8, 
I present contemporary data on bequest motives and bequest division in Japan and, where available, the U. 
S. from a number of sources. 
 
3. Historical Evidence on Bequest Practices 
In this section, I present historical evidence on bequest practices in Japan.  As the excellent 
surveys of Aoyama et al. (1974) and Ohtake (1996) show, bequest practices in Japan have differed 
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substantially over time, among social classes, and among regions.  For example, dividing one’s bequest 
among all of one’s children was common among all social classes during the early Tokugawa (Edo) period 
(1603-1868) but had been replaced by male primogeniture (the practice of leaving everything to the eldest 
son and having him carry on the family line) by the middle of the Tokugawa period.  Strict male 
primogeniture was observed by the samurai (warrior-bureaucrat) class but not by farmers and 
townspeople (craftsmen and merchants), even after the middle of the Tokugawa period.  For one thing, 
only inherited assets (land, housing, and farmland) were bequeathed entirely to the eldest son, with other 
(acquired) assets being divided among all of one’s children, and moreover, if the eldest son did not have 
the ability to farm (in the case of farmers) or to carry on the family business (in the case of townspeople), 
the second son, third son, or adopted son was designated as the heir. 
Furthermore, in some regions, entirely different practices were followed.  For example, in 
southwestern Japan (especially southwestern Kyushu), male ultimogeniture or postremogeniture (masshi 
souzoku), the practice of leaving more to the youngest son rather than the eldest son and having the 
youngest son carry on the family line, was widespread.  The youngest son would typically live with the 
parents until the end and would be rewarded by getting the largest share of the parents’ inheritance (albeit 
not all of it).  More precisely, the parents’ assets were divided equally among their sons except that the 
youngest son received twice the share of the other sons or a bonus called tokushu zaisan (special assets). 
Another practice also found in southwestern Japan was inkyo bunke (post-retirement branch 
family).  Under this practice, when the eldest son got married, the parents and younger children would 
cede the family home to him and his wife and move into a new home.  When the second son got married, 
the parents and younger children would cede the second family home to him and his wife and move into a 
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new home and so on until only the youngest son and the parents were left.  The eldest son would typically 
carry on the family line, but all of the sons would share equally in the care of the elderly parents, and either 
the parents’ assets were divided equally or a disproportionate share was given to the eldest son. 
One practice that was found in the Tohoku region was ane katoku souzoku (inheritance by the 
elder sister), also called shoseiji souzoku (inheritance by the first-born child).  Under this practice, the 
eldest child (not the eldest son) was designated as the heir, carrying on the family line and inheriting all of 
the parents’ assets.  If the eldest child were a girl, she (the eldest son’s elder sister) would be designated as 
the heir, hence the name ane katoku souzoku.4 
The so-called Meiji Civil Code, which was promulgated in 1896-98, made male primogeniture 
the rule for all social classes and made deviations from this rule illegal.  As a result, practices not 
consistent with male primogeniture such as male ultimogeniture and ane katoku souzoku declined rapidly 
thereafter. 
Finally, Japan’s civil code was drastically revised in 1947, with the ie system being abolished 
and the division of bequests being changed from male primogeniture to equal division in principle (i.e., 
unless the individual leaves a will specifying otherwise). 
With which models of household behavior are these practices consistent?5  The practice of male 
primogeniture (male ultimogeniture, ane katoku souzoku) is consistent with the dynasty model because 
the eldest son (youngest son, eldest child) typically carries on the family line or the family business in 
exchange for receiving the entire bequest (or the largest share thereof), but at the same time, it is also 
consistent with the selfish life cycle model because it is typically the eldest son (youngest son, eldest 
child) who lives with, and cares for, the aged parents in exchange for receiving the entire bequest (or the 
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largest share thereof).   
Similarly, the practice of designating as the heir the son most capable of carrying on the family 
farm or the family business is clearly consistent with the dynasty model.   
The practices of inkyo bunke is consistent with the dynasty model because the eldest son 
typically carries on the family line in exchange for receiving a disproportionate share of the parents’ 
bequest, but at the same time, it is also consistent with the selfish life cycle model because all sons share 
equally in the care of their elderly parents and either the parents’ assets are divided equally among all of 
their sons or each son gets at least something. 
Finally, the division of parental assets among all of one’s children by all social classes during the 
early Tokugawa period, the division of acquired assets among all of one’s children by farmers and 
townspeople throughout the Tokugawa period, the practices of masshi souzoku and inkyo bunke, and the 
postwar civil code are all consistent with the altruism model because they provide for equal division of 
parental assets or for each child to get at least something. 
Thus, prewar bequest practices have elements of all three models of household behavior but are 
perhaps most consistent with the dynasty model, while the postwar principle of equal division is consistent 
with the altruism model.  However, it should be noted that, even during the postwar period, many 
individuals have chosen unequal division by leaving a will or by coming to an informal agreement with 
their children and asking some of their children to “voluntarily” forfeit their inheritance rights (see 
Noguchi, Uemura, and Kitou (1989)) and that this is consistent with either the selfish life cycle model, 
altruism model, or dynasty model, depending on what criterion is used to divide the bequest.  
Unfortunately, therefore, the historical evidence on bequest practices sheds little light on which model of 
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household behavior applies in Japan, and the only inference that can be drawn is that the dynasty model 
was perhaps the most applicable model (but certainly not the only model) of household behavior from the 
middle of the Tokugawa period until the Second World War.  Fortunately, detailed data are available on 
actual bequest behavior and attitudes towards bequests in contemporary Japan, and it is to these data that I 
now turn. 
 
4. Data Sources 
In this section, I describe the three data sources used in the subsequent analysis. 
(1) The Public Opinion Survey on Saving and Consumption.  The first data source I used is 
the Public Opinion Survey on Saving and Consumption  (Chochiku to Shouhi ni kansuru Seron Chousa), 
which until 1992 was called the Public Opinion Survey on Saving (Chochiku ni kansuru Seron Chousa).  
This survey has been conducted every year since 1953 by the Central Council for Financial Information 
(Kin’yuu Kouhou Chuuou Iinkai), which was originally called the Central Council for Savings Promotion 
(Chochiku Zoukyou Chuuou Iinkai) and later renamed the Central Council for Savings Information 
(Chochiku Kouhou Chuuou Iinkai).  Note, however, that only the 1989 and 1990 surveys contain 
questions about bequest motives.  This survey (hereafter referred to as the POSSC) surveys 6,000 
randomly selected households from throughout Japan and obtains about 4,100 to 4,300 responses.  These 
data are also analyzed by Ohtake and Horioka (1994, forthcoming). 
(2) The Survey on the Financial Asset Choice of Households.  The second data source I used 
is the Survey on the Financial Asset Choice of Households (Kakei ni okeru Kin’yuu Shisan Sentaku ni 
kansuru Chousa), which has been conducted every two years since 1988 by the Institute for Posts and 
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Telecommunications Policy (Yuusei Kenkyuu-sho) of the Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, 
and Posts and Telecommunications (Soumu-shou) (formerly the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (Yuusei-shou)) of the Government of Japan.  This survey (hereafter referred to as 
SFACH) surveys 6,000 randomly selected households (5,010 in 2001) from throughout Japan and obtains 
about 3,500 to 4,000 responses (about 3,100 in 2001).6  These data are also analyzed by Horioka et al. 
(2001).  I analyze the data from the 1988, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2001 administrations of this 
survey. 
(3) The Comparative Survey on Savings in Japan and the United States.  The third data 
source I used is the Comparative Survey on Savings in Japan and the United States (Chochiku ni kansuru 
Nichibei Hikaku Chousa), which was conducted simultaneously in Japan and the U.S. in 1996 by the 
Institute for Posts and Telecommunications Policy of what was then called the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications of the Government of Japan.  This survey (hereafter referred to as the Japan-U.S. 
Survey) surveyed 1,800 households in both Japan and the U.S. using identical questionnaires and obtained 
1,243 and 1,508 responses, respectively.  These data are also analyzed by Horioka et al. (1998, 2000, 
2001). 
Note that all of the data pertaining to bequests in data sources (2) and (3) are inclusive of inter 
vivos transfers but that it is not clear whether or not the data in data source (1) is inclusive of inter vivos 
transfers. 
 
5. Evidence on the Strength of Bequest Motives 
In this section, I present data pertaining to the strength of people’s bequest motives in Japan and 
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the U.S.  In subsection 5.1, I present data on the proportion of respondents who have received bequests 
from their parents in the past, and in subsection 5.2, I present data on the proportion of respondents with 
plans to leave a bequest to their children.   
 
5.1. Data on the Proportion of Respondents Who Have Received Bequests in the Past 
 In this subsection, I present data on the proportion of respondents who have received bequests 
from their parents or parents-in-law in the past for Japan only (no data are available for the U.S.).  For the 
purposes of this analysis, I confine myself to respondents who are 60 years old or older because it is highly 
likely that all of their parents and parents-in-law are already deceased.  According to the SFACH 
(1990-1996), 34.74% to 40.19% of respondents aged 60 or older have ever received bequests from their 
parents or parents-in-law (see Table 2).7   
 
5.2. Data on the Proportion of Respondents with Plans to Leave a Bequest  
In this subsection, I present data on the proportion of respondents who plan to leave a bequest in 
Japan and the U.S.8  Such data are available in all three of the surveys discussed above, but the wording of 
the question differs from survey to survey.  For example, “Do not plan to make any special efforts to leave 
a bequest to my/our child or children but will leave behind whatever happens to be left over” is not given 
as one of the choices in the POSS and the 1992 SFACH, whereas it is given as one of the choices in the 
1994, 1996, 1998, and 2001 SFACH and the Japan-U.S. Survey.  Since the proportion of respondents 
selecting this choice is approximately one-half or more in the surveys in which it is given as one of the 
choices, the results will be severely biased if it is not given as one of the choices.  I have therefore decided 
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to focus on the surveys in which this choice is given as one of the choices, and if one does so, the results 
for Japan are remarkably consistent, with about one-fourth of respondents planning to make an effort to 
leave a bequest (see Table 3).  By contrast, a full 46% of Americans plan to make an effort to leave a 
bequest.  Thus, the proportion of respondents planning to make an effort to leave a bequest is nearly twice 
as high in the U.S. as it is in Japan, but it is less than half even in the U.S.  Thus, it appears that bequest 
motives are weak in both the U.S. and Japan but especially weak in the case of Japan. 
 However, in order to determine which model of household behavior is more applicable in the 
real world, it is more important to look at the nature of people’s bequest motives and on their attitudes 
toward bequest division than it is to look at the strength of their bequest motives because, as shown in 
section 2, positive bequests are consistent with all three models of household behavior.   Thus, it is to data 
on the nature of people’s bequest motives and on their attitudes toward bequest division to which I turn in 
the next two sections. 
 
6. Evidence on the Nature of People’s Bequest Motives  
 In this section, I present data on the nature of people’s bequest motives in Japan and the U.S.  In 
subsection 6.1, I present data on the bequest motives of respondents’ parents, and in subsection 6.2, I 
present data on the bequest motives of the respondents themselves. 
 
6.1. Data on the Bequest Motives of Respondents’ Parents 
 I look first at data on the bequest motives of the parents of respondents for Japan only (no data 
are available for the U.S.).  The 1990 and 1992 SFACH collect data on whether respondents have received 
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bequests in the past and whether or not those bequests were conditional on taking care of their parents.  
Thus, there are three categories of respondents—those receiving unconditional bequests, those receiving 
conditional bequests, and those not receiving any bequests at all.  The behavior of the parents of those 
belonging to the first category is consistent with the altruism model, while the behavior of the parents of 
those belonging to the second and third categories is consistent with the life cycle model.  The results for 
respondents aged 60 or older are shown in Table 2 (I confined the sample to respondents aged 60 or older 
because I wanted to focus on those whose parents are likely to have already passed away), and as this table 
shows, the largest category is those not receiving bequests at all (59.81% in 1990 and 62.75% in 1992), the 
second largest category is those receiving conditional bequests (26.66% in 1990 and 18.77% in 1992), and 
the smallest category is those receiving unconditional bequests (13.54% in 1990 and 18.47% in 1992).  
Since the two largest categories are both consistent with the life cycle model, the share of respondents’ 
parents whose behavior is consistent with the life cycle model was a full 86.46% in 1990% and 81.53% in 
1992, and the proportion of parents whose behavior is consistent with the altruism model was only 13.54% 
in 1990 and 18.47% in 1992.  
 
6.2. Data on the Bequest Motives of Respondents 
I look next at data on the nature of the bequest motives of respondents in Japan and the U.S.  One 
question in the SFACH and the Japan-U.S. Survey asks respondents which of the following six attitudes 
toward bequests is closest to their own: (1) plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or children no matter 
what, (2) plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or children only if my/our child or children take care of 
me/us, (3) plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or children only if my/our child or children take over the 
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family business, (4) do not plan to make any special efforts to leave a bequest to my/our child or children 
but will leave behind whatever happens to be left over, (5) other, and (6) do not feel it is necessary to leave 
a bequest to my/our child or children under any circumstances.  Unfortunately, choice (3) is not one of the 
choices given in the case of the 1992 and 1994 SFACH and the Japan-U.S. Survey, choice (4) is not one 
the choices given in the case of the 1992 SFACH, and choice (5) is not one of the choices given in the case 
of the Japan-U.S. Survey.  The POSSC also includes a question about the nature of the bequest motives of 
respondents, but the choices are much more limited: the only choices given are choices (1), (2), and (6) 
above except that choice (6) is broken down into (6a) do not plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or 
children because I/we want to enjoy my/our own lives and (6b) do not plan to leave a bequest to my/our 
child or children because the expectation of receiving a bequest from me/us might cause my/our child or 
children to lose the will to work.  Choices (1) and (6b) are consistent with the altruism model, choices (2), 
(4), and (6a) are consistent with the life cycle model, choice (3) is consistent with the dynasty model, and 
it is not clear with which model choice (5) is consistent.   
Since the proportion of respondents selecting choice (4) is approximately one-half or more in the 
surveys in which it is given as one of the choices, the results will be severely biased if it is not given as one 
of the choices.  I have therefore decided to focus on the surveys in which choice (4) is given as one of the 
choices (the 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2001 SFACH and the Japan-U.S. Survey).   
The results are shown in Table 4, and looking first at the results based on the SFACH 
(1994-2001), “do not plan to make any special efforts to leave a bequest to my/our child or children but 
will leave behind whatever happens to be left over” and “do not feel it is necessary to leave a bequest to 
my/our child or children under any circumstances,” both of which are consistent with the life cycle 
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model,9 are by far the dominant attitudes toward bequests, with a full 46.06 to 49.75% and 24.16 to 
27.33%, respectively, of respondents holding these views.  “Plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or 
children no matter what,” which is consistent with the altruism model, is in third place, with 17.14 to 
19.89% of respondents holding this view.  “Plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or children only if 
my/our child or children take care of me/us,” which is consistent with the life cycle model, and “plan to 
leave a bequest to my/our child or children only if my/our child or children take over the family business,” 
which is consistent with the dynasty model, are in distant fourth and fifth place, respectively, with a mere 
4.94 to 6.80% and 1.30 to 1.57%, respectively, of respondents holding these views. 
Looking next at the proportion of respondents whose views are consistent with each model of 
household behavior, an overwhelming proportion (77.23 to 81.11%) of respondents hold a view that is 
consistent with the life cycle model, only 17.14 to 19.89% hold a view that is consistent with the altruism 
model, and a mere 1.30 to 1.57% hold a view that is consistent with the dynasty model. 
Turning to the results from the Japan-U.S. Survey, these results are not strictly comparable to 
those from the SFACH because the wording of the question about bequest motives is somewhat different 
with the biggest difference being that the no bequest option is “do not feel it is necessary to leave a bequest 
to my/our child or children under any circumstances” in the SFACH but is “do not plan to leave a bequest 
to my/our child or children under any circumstances” in the Japan-U.S. Survey (italics added).  Since there 
are many who leave a bequest even though they do not feel it is necessary to do so, the proportion of 
respondents choosing the no bequest option is much higher (and the proportion of respondents choosing 
the option “do not plan to make any special efforts to leave a bequest to my/our child or children but will 
leave behind whatever happens to be left over” is much lower) in the case of the Japan-U.S. Survey.  
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Moreover, there are other differences as well—for example, “plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or 
children only if my/our child or children take over the family business” and “other” are among the choices 
in the case of the SFACH but not in the case of the Japan-U.S. Survey. 
If these differences are taken into account, the results for Japan from the Japan-U.S. Survey are 
broadly consistent with the results from the SFACH: “do not plan to make any special efforts to leave a 
bequest to my/our child or children but will leave behind whatever happens to be left over” which is 
consistent with the life cycle model, is by far the most dominant view, with 69.33% of respondents holding 
this view,  “plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or children no matter what,” which is consistent with 
the altruism model, is number two, with 19.28% of respondents holding this view, and “plan to leave a 
bequest to my/our child/children only if my/our child or children take care of me/us” and “do not plan to 
leave a bequest to my/our child or children under any circumstances,” both of which are consistent with 
the life cycle model, are a distant third and fourth, respectively, with 6.39% and 5.00%, respectively, of 
respondents holding these views.  (No information is available on the proportion of respondents who “plan 
to leave a bequest to my/our child or children only if my/our child or children take over the family 
business.”)  Thus, 80.72% of respondents have a bequest motive that is consistent with the life cycle 
model and 19.28% a bequest motive that is consistent with the altruism model, and these figures are 
remarkably consistent with the figures from the SFACH. 
Looking finally at the U.S. results from the Japan-U.S. Survey, “do not plan to make any special 
efforts to leave a bequest to my/our child or children but will leave behind whatever happens to be left 
over,” which is consistent with the life cycle model, is number one, as in the case of the Japanese results, 
but the proportion of respondents holding this view is much lower than in the case of the Japanese results 
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(51.13% vs. 69.33%).  “Plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or children no matter what,” which is 
consistent with the altruism model, is number two, as in the case of the Japanese results, but the proportion 
of respondents holding this view is more than twice as high as in the case of the Japanese results (42.53% 
vs. 19.28%).  Finally, “plan to leave a bequest to my/our child/children only if my/our child or children 
take care of me/us” and “do not plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or children under any 
circumstances,” both of which are consistent with the life cycle model, are a distant third and fourth, 
respectively, as in the case of the Japanese results, but the proportion of respondents holding these views 
are quite a bit lower than in the case of the Japanese results (3.40% vs. 6.39% and 2.93% vs. 5.00%, 
respectively).   
As a result, the proportion of respondents who have a bequest motive that is consistent with the 
life cycle model is much lower in the U.S. than in Japan (57.47% vs. 80.72%), whereas the proportion of 
respondents who have a bequest motive that is consistent with the altruism model is more than twice as 
high in the U.S. than it is in Japan (42.53% vs. 19.28%). 
Thus, the majority of respondents in both countries have bequest motives that are consistent with 
the life cycle model, but this proportion is much higher in Japan than it is in the U.S.  Conversely, the 
proportion of respondents with a bequest motive that is consistent with the altruism model is more than 
twice as high in the U.S. as it is in Japan. 
 
7. Evidence on Bequest Division 
 In this section, I present data on bequest division in Japan and the U.S.  In subsection 7.1, I 
present data on the division of the respondents’ parents’ and parents-in-law’s bequests, and in subsection 
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7.2, I present data on the respondents’ attitudes toward the division of their own bequest. 
 
7.1. Data on the Division of Respondents’ Parents’ and Parents-in-Law’s Bequests 
In this subsection, I present data on the division of respondents’ parents’ and parents-in-law’s 
bequests for Japan only (no data are available for the U.S.).  In the 1998 and 2001 SFACH, respondents are 
asked how their parents’ and parents-in-law’s bequests were divided with the choices being: (1) divided 
equally, (2) more or all to the child or children who took care of the parents, (3) more or all to the child or 
children who took over the family business, (4) more or all to the child or children who had less income, 
(5) more or all to the eldest son/daughter even though he/she did not take care of the parents, and (6) other.  
Method (2) is consistent with the life cycle model, methods (3) and (5) with the dynasty model, and 
method (4) with the altruism model.  Method (1) is not, in general, consistent with any model of household 
behavior, but it is consistent with the altruism model if we assume that the earnings capacity relative to 
consumption needs of all of one’s children are roughly equal. 
The results are shown in Table 5, and as can be seen from this table, “divided equally,” which is 
most consistent with the altruism model, is the dominant method of bequest division in three out of four 
cases (and second in one case), with 28.04 to 37.43% of parents and parents-in-law dividing their bequests 
in this way.  “More or all to the child or children who took care of the parents,” which is consistent with the 
life cycle model, is a relatively close second in three out of four cases (and first in one case), with 24.27 to 
32.43% of parents and parents-in-law dividing their bequests in this way.  The ranking of the other 
methods of bequest division differs somewhat between years, with “no bequests left” ranking third in 
1998, with 13.60 to 14.91% of parents and parents-in-law not leaving a bequest, followed by “more or all 
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to the child or children who took over the family business” in fourth place (6.73 to 9.39%), “more or all to 
the eldest son/daughter even though the eldest son/daughter did not take care of the parents” in fifth place 
(4.68 to 5.94%), and “more or all to the child or children who had less income” in sixth place (0.38 to 
1.75%).  In 2001, “more or all to the child or children who took over the family business” ranked third 
with 12.20 to 13.85% of parents and parents-in-law dividing their bequests in this way, followed by “more 
or all to the eldest son/daughter even though the eldest son/daughter did not take care of the parents” in 
fourth place (9.06 to 10.64%), “no bequests left” in fifth place (2.87 to 8.36%), and “more or all to the 
child or children who had less income” in sixth place (0.00 to 0.51%). 
Looking next at the proportion of respondents whose parents’ and parents-in-law’s method of 
bequest division is consistent with each model of household behavior, the life cycle model is the dominant 
model in all cases (but tied for first in one case), with the method of bequest division of 33.45 to 40.04% of 
parents and parents-in-law being consistent with the life cycle model, followed by the altruism model in 
second place (28.55 to 39.18%) and the dynasty model in third place (11.40 to 24.49%).  
 
7.2. Data on Respondents’ Attitudes toward Bequest Division 
In this subsection, I present data on the attitudes of respondents toward the division of their 
bequests in Japan and the U.S.10  In the surveys I used in this analysis, respondents are asked if they feel it 
is necessary to leave a bequest to their child or children and those who feel that it is necessary to leave a 
bequest to their child or children are asked which of six attitudes toward bequest division is closest to their 
own: (1) divide equally, (2) give more or all to the child or children who take care of me/us, (3) give more 
or all to the child or children who take over the family business, (4) give more or all to the child or children 
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who has less income, (5) give more or all to the eldest son/daughter even if he/she does not take care of 
me/us, and (6) other.  (These six attitudes coincide almost exactly with the six methods of bequest division 
given in the question regarding the division of the parents’ and parents-in-law’s bequests.)   
Note that the wording of the question about attitudes toward bequest division is problematic in 
the case of the 1994 SFACH.  In this year, attitude (5) is worded “give more or all to the eldest 
son/daughter,” and the qualification “even if he/she does not take care of me/us” is omitted.  Thus, 
respondents who want to give more or all to their eldest son/daughter because he/she took care of them 
would not be sure whether to pick attitude (2) or attitude (5), and for this reason, the proportion of 
respondents selecting attitude (5) is more than twice as high in 1994 as it is in later years.   Since the results 
for 1994 are neither reliable nor comparable to the results for later years, I will focus primarily on the 
results for 1996 and later. 
The results are shown in Table 6, and looking first at the results from the SFACH, “divide 
equally,” which is most consistent with the altruism model, is the dominant attitude toward bequest 
division in all years, with 36.15 to 42.75% of respondents holding this view.  “I/we do not feel it is 
necessary to leave a bequest to my/our child or children under any circumstances” and “give more or all to 
the child or children who take care of me/us,” both of which are consistent with the life cycle model, are in 
second and third place, respectively, with 24.16 to 27.33% and 21.12 to 24.10%, respectively, of 
respondents holding these views.  “Give more or all to the eldest son/daughter even if the eldest 
son/daughter does not take care of me/us” and “give more or all to the child or children who take over the 
family business,” both of which are consistent with the dynasty model, are in distant fourth and fifth place, 
respectively, with 3.46 to 6.30% and 2.62 to 3.66%, respectively, of respondents holding these views.  
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Finally, “give more or all to the child or children who has less income,” which is consistent with the 
altruism model, is in last place with a mere 0.70 to 0.93% of respondents holding this view. 
Looking next at the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward bequest division is 
consistent with each model of household behavior, the attitude toward bequest division of 46.83 to 48.46% 
of respondents is consistent with the life cycle model, that of 36.89 to 43.45% of respondents is consistent 
with the altruism model, and that of 6.07 to 9.77% of respondents is consistent with the dynasty model.  
Thus, the rank order of the various models of household behavior is the same as in the case of the results 
based on bequest motives, with the life cycle model first, the altruism model second, and the dynasty 
model third, but the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward bequest division is consistent with 
the life cycle and dynasty models is much lower and the proportion of households whose attitude toward 
bequest division is consistent with the altruism model is much higher than in the case of the results based 
on bequest motives. 
Turning to the results for Japan from the Japan-U.S. Survey, the results are not strictly 
comparable to those from the SFACH for the reasons given earlier, but if these differences are taken into 
account, the results are broadly consistent.  “Divide equally,” which is most consistent with the altruism 
model, is again the dominant attitude toward bequest division, with 44.17% of respondents holding this 
view, but “I/we do not feel it is necessary to leave a bequest to my/our child or children under any 
circumstances,” which is consistent with the life cycle model, falls from second to fifth place, presumably 
because of the difference in wording noted earlier, with only 5.00% of respondents holding this view.  
“Give more or all to the child or children who take care of me/us,” which is also consistent with the life 
cycle model, rises from third to second place, with 29.21% of respondents holding this view, and “give 
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more or all to the eldest son/daughter even if the eldest son/daughter does not take care of me/us” and 
“give more or all to the child or children who take over the family business,” both of which are consistent 
with the dynasty model, rise from fourth to third and fifth to fourth place, respectively, with 7.71% and 
5.73%, respectively, of respondents holding these views.  Finally, “give more or all to the child or children 
who has less income,” which is consistent with the altruism model, remains in last place with a mere 
1.75% of respondents holding this view.  As a result, the altruism model is now the dominant model of 
household behavior in Japan, with the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward bequest division is 
consistent with the altruism model increasing to a full 45.92%.   By contrast, the life cycle model falls 
from first place to second place, with the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward bequest 
division is consistent with the life cycle model falling to only 34.21%, and the dynasty model remains in 
third place, with the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward bequest division is consistent with 
the dynasty model being a mere 13.44%. 
Turning finally to the U.S. results from the Japan-U.S. Survey, “divide equally,” which is most 
consistent with the altruism model, is the dominant attitude toward bequest division, as in the case of the 
Japanese results, but the proportion of respondents holding this view is nearly twice as high in the U.S. as 
it is in Japan (84.10% vs. 44.17%).11 12  Conversely, the other five attitudes toward bequest division are all 
of only negligible importance in the U.S.: no more than 3.09% of respondents hold any of these views and 
the proportion of respondents holding each of these views is lower in the U.S. than it is in Japan, with the 
gap being especially large in the case of “give more or all to the child or children who take care of me/us” 
(3.09% vs. 29.21%).  As a result, the altruism model is by far the most dominant model of household 
behavior in the U.S. with 84.51% of respondents having an attitude toward bequest division that is 
 26
 
 
 
 
consistent with the altruism model; this proportion is almost twice as high as the corresponding proportion 
for Japan.   Conversely, only 6.02% of U.S. respondents have an attitude toward bequest division that is 
consistent with the life cycle model (a proportion that is less than one-fifth of the corresponding 
proportion for Japan), and the proportion of respondents whose attitude toward bequest division is 
consistent with the dynasty model is also far lower in the U.S. than it is in Japan (2.57% vs. 13.44%). 
 
8. Summary of Findings regarding Bequest Motives and Bequest Division 
Finally, I summarize my findings regarding bequest motives and bequest division in Table 7.  
Looking first at the results for the life cycle model for Japan, the results regarding bequest motives (those 
of the parents of respondents as well as those of the respondents themselves) suggest that the behavior of 
77.23 to 91.53% of individuals is consistent with the life cycle model, while the results regarding bequest 
division (that of the parents of respondents as well as that of the respondents themselves) suggest that the 
behavior of 33.45 to 48.46% of individuals is consistent with the life cycle model.  Turning to the results 
for the U.S., the results regarding the bequest motives of respondents suggest that the behavior of 57.47% 
of individuals is consistent with the life cycle model, while the results regarding attitudes toward bequest 
division suggest that the behavior of only 6.02% of individuals is consistent with the life cycle model.   
Looking next at the results for the altruism model for Japan, the results regarding bequest 
motives suggest that the behavior of 13.54 to 19.89% of individuals is consistent with the altruism model, 
while the results regarding the attitudes toward bequest division of respondents suggest that the behavior 
of 28.55 to 45.92% of individuals is consistent with the altruism model.  Turning to the results for the U.S., 
the results regarding the bequest motives of respondents suggest that the behavior of 42.53% of 
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individuals is consistent with the altruism model, while the results regarding attitudes toward bequest 
division suggest that the behavior of a full 84.51% of individuals is consistent with the altruism model.   
Looking finally at the results for the dynasty model for Japan, the results regarding the bequest 
motives of respondents suggest that the behavior of 1.30 to 1.57% of individuals is consistent with the 
dynasty model, and the results regarding the attitudes toward bequest division of respondents suggest that 
the behavior of 6.07 to 24.49% of individuals is consistent with the dynasty model.  Turning to the results 
for the U.S., the results regarding attitudes toward bequest division suggest that the behavior of only 
2.57% of individuals is consistent with the dynasty model.   
Thus, the exact proportions of individuals whose behavior is consistent with each model of 
household behavior are quite different depending on the criterion used, but the results are broadly 
consistent in suggesting that the life cycle model is the dominant model of household behavior in Japan 
and that it is far more applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S., that the dynasty model is also more 
applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S. but that it is not of dominant importance even in Japan, and 
conversely, that the altruism model is far more applicable in the U.S. than it is in Japan.   The only 
exception is that the results based on attitudes toward bequest division suggest that the behavior of only a 
minority of individuals is consistent with the life cycle model, but the proportion of individuals whose 
behavior is consistent with the life cycle model is likely to be an underestimate because “divide equally” is 
not, strictly speaking, consistent with the altruism model.   
 
9. Evidence on Respondents’ Willingness to Help Others 
 The last type of evidence I wish to consider is data on the willingness of respondents to give 
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financial assistance to others for Japan only (no data are available for the U.S.).  The 1998 and 2001 
SFACH include the following question “Would you be willing to give financial assistance to the following 
categories of individuals if they were temporarily short of cash?  Please assume that the money will never 
be repaid,” and the categories given are “your own parents,” “your spouse’s parents,” “your children,” 
“your brothers and sisters,” “friends,” “acquaintances,” “disaster victims,” and “complete strangers” 
(except that not all choices are given in both years).  Assuming that there is no quid pro quo for the 
financial assistance given, those answering “yes” to this question can be regarded as harboring altruistic 
feelings toward the category of individuals in question, and thus data of this type can be used to test 
whether the altruism model applies in the real world.  In particular, if the parental altruism model 
described in section 2 applies, respondents should reply that they are willing to give financial assistance to 
their own children but not to anyone else.  If the life cycle model applies, respondents should not be 
willing to give financial assistance to anyone, and if the dynasty model applies, respondents should be 
willing to give financial assistance only to the child who carries on the family line and/or the family 
business.  Note, however, that if there is a quid pro quo for the financial assistance given (for example, the 
financial assistance is conditional on the recipient giving financial assistance to the donor if and when the 
donor faces financial difficulty (a risk-sharing agreement à la Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991), and 
Townsend (1994)), the willingness to give financial assistance to any and all categories of people is fully 
consistent with all three models of household behavior including the selfish life cycle model and is not 
necessarily evidence of altruism. 
The results are shown in Table 8, and if we temporarily ignore the possibility of risk sharing, this 
table suggests that respondents are most altruistic toward their own children, with 91.59 to 91.86% of 
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respondents being willing to give financial assistance to their own children.  Somewhat surprisingly, 
respondents are almost as altruistic toward their own parents and their spouse’s parents as they are toward 
their own children, with 86.37 to 88.62% of respondents being willing to give financial assistance to their 
own parents and 84.38 to 84.83% being willing to give financial assistance to their spouse’s parents.  
Respondents are also fairly altruistic toward siblings and disaster victims, with 60.30 to 61.59% of the 
respondents being willing to give financial assistance to siblings and 49.34% of respondents being willing 
to give financial assistance to disaster victims.  By contrast, respondents are not very altruistic toward 
friends, acquaintances, and complete strangers, with only 19.43%, 11.24%. and 1.56% of respondents 
being willing to give financial assistance to friends, acquaintances, and complete strangers, respectively. 
 These results appear to contradict the earlier results regarding bequest motives and bequest 
division and suggest that the altruism model applies to a far greater proportion of individuals than 
suggested by the earlier results.  Moreover, the fact that individuals are almost as altruistic toward their 
own parents as they are toward their own children suggests that a reciprocal (two-sided) altruism model is 
more applicable than the parental (one-sided) altruism model described in section 2.  Furthermore, 
individuals appear to harbor altruism not only toward their own children and parents but also toward their 
siblings and disaster victims.  The fact that individuals are far more likely to help disaster victims than 
friends, acquaintances, and complete strangers suggests that they are motivated more by risk sharing (or 
reciprocal altruism) considerations than by purely altruistic considerations.13  Indeed, their willingness to 
help family members could also be motivated by risk sharing considerations rather than by pure altruism.  
Thus, perhaps the results in this section are not as strongly supportive of altruism and not as inconsistent 
with the earlier results regarding bequest motives and bequest division as it appears at first glance. 
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10. More Formal Tests  
 Next, I would like to briefly survey a number of more formal tests of the applicability of various 
models of household behavior. 
 
10.1. Analyses of the Impact of Parental Bequest Motives and Parental Assets on the 
Behavior of Children 
A number of papers have examined whether there is a link between parental bequest motives or 
the amount of parental assets and the amount of financial support and/or care parents receive from their 
children.  If parents are altruistic or dynastic, they should leave bequests to their children regardless of 
whether or not their children provide financial support and/or care to them, and similarly, if children are 
altruistic, they should provide financial support and/or care to their parents regardless of whether or not 
they expect to receive bequests or inter vivos transfers from their parents and should be more likely to 
provide financial support and/or care to their parents the less wealthy their parents are.  Thus, there should 
be no correlation between parental bequest motives and the amount of financial support and/or care 
parents receive from their children, and there should be a negative correlation between parental assets and 
the amount of financial support and/or care parents receive from their children.  By contrast, if parents are 
selfish, they will make bequests conditional on receiving financial support and/or care from their children, 
and similarly, if children are selfish, they will be more likely to provide financial support and/or care to 
their parents if they expect to receive bequests or inter vivos transfers from their parents (especially if such 
transfers are conditional on providing financial support and/or care to their parents) or if the amount of 
such transfers is large.  Thus, there should be a positive correlation between parental bequest motives and 
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the amount of financial support and/or care parents receive from their children as well as between parental 
assets (a proxy for the amount of bequests and inter vivos transfers) and the amount of financial support 
and/or care parents receive from their children. 
Turning to the empirical findings for Japan, Horioka et al. (1998, 2000, 2001) find that parents 
with bequest motives are more likely to live with their children and more likely to receive financial 
support and/or care from their children than are parents without bequest motives.  Similarly, Noguchi, 
Uemura, and Kitou (1989) find that children who live with their parents are much more likely to receive a 
bequest that those who live apart from their parents (63.3% vs. 20.5%) and that the probability of 
receiving a bequest increases sharply with the amount of financial support provided (from 29.2% in the 
case of a small amount of support to 66.7% in the case of a large amount of support). 
 Komamura (1994) and Ohtake and Horioka (1994, forthcoming) find that the housing assets of 
parents increase the likelihood of their children living with them, and Ohtake and Horioka (1994, 
forthcoming) also find that the financial net worth of parents increases the amount of financial support 
they receive from their children (given that they receive support).14  If we regard coresidence as a proxy 
for care, all of these findings are consistent with the selfish life cycle model and inconsistent with the 
altruism and dynasty models.  
 
10.2. Analyses of the Impact of Public Pensions on Consumption/Saving 
Takayama et al. (1990) is the most careful analysis of the impact of public pensions on the 
consumption/saving of pre-retirement individuals.  If the selfish life cycle model or the dynasty model 
holds, an increase in public pension benefits will reduce household saving because the two are substitute 
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sources of retirement income, but if the altruism model holds, public pension benefits (or, more precisely, 
the portion that represents a net transfer from younger generations) will not affect household saving 
because the reduction in retirement saving caused by an increase in public pension benefits will be 
precisely offset by the increased saving needed to compensate future generations for bearing the burden of 
the higher level of the current generation’s public pension benefits.  Looking at the results, Takayama et al. 
(1990) find that public pension wealth has a positive and significant impact on the consumption of 
pre-retirement households, which supports the selfish life cycle model, but that when they break public 
pension wealth down into the part attributable to the current generation’s own public pension 
contributions and the part that represents a net transfer from younger generations, the results are 
inconclusive, with the impact of net transfers being estimated to be negative in some cases and positive in 
others.  Thus, the results are somewhat inconclusive results but provide some support for the selfish life 
cycle model.15 
 
10.3. Analyses of the Impact of the Distribution of Resources within Extended Families on 
Their Consumption Patterns  
Hayashi (1995) examines whether the distribution of resources within Japanese extended 
families affects their consumption patterns using micro data from the 1979 and 1984 National Survey of 
Family Income and Expenditure (Zenkoku Shouhi Jittai Chousa), which was conducted by what was then 
called the Statistics Bureau of the Management and Coordination Agency (Soumu-chou Toukei-kyoku) of 
the Japanese Government.  If the altruism model applies, the distribution of resources within extended 
families should not affect their consumption patterns (the so-called neutrality property), but Hayashi finds 
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that the higher is the parents’ share of household income, the greater is the household’s expenditure on 
food items preferred by the parents.  This finding suggests that the altruism model does not apply in the 
case of Japan although Hayashi does not rule out the presence of a less extreme form of altruism between 
Japanese parents and children.    
 
10.4. Analyses of the Impact of Tax Policy on Consumer Spending 
Watanabe, Watanabe, and Watanabe (2001) analyze the impact of tax policy on consumer 
spending in Japan and find that tax changes (especially permanent changes) have a significant effect on 
consumer spending and that the null hypothesis that the fraction of Ricardian (altruistic) consumers is zero 
cannot be rejected. 
 
10.5. Analyses of Inter-cohort Differences in Lifetime Incomes 
If individuals are altruistic, lifetime incomes should be equalized across cohorts, but Saito 
(forthcoming) finds that there are large differences in lifetime incomes across cohorts in both the U.S. and 
Japan, which leads him to conclude that individuals in neither country are altruistic. 
 
10.6. Summary  
The results from at least four of the five types of tests are consistent with the selfish life cycle 
model and inconsistent with the altruism model, and there is virtually no evidence in favor of the altruism 
model.  Thus, the results of the more formal tests are generally consistent with most of the foregoing 
survey evidence. 
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11. Conclusions 
What conclusions can be reached from these diverse and sometimes contradictory findings?  
One thing that can be said for sure is that no model of household behavior has universal applicability in 
either Japan or the U.S.  The various models of household behavior appear to coexist in both countries and 
perhaps even within the same individual.  Nonetheless, it appears that the selfish life cycle model is the 
most highly applicable model in both Japan and the U.S. but that it applies to a far greater extent in Japan 
than it does in the U.S., that the dynasty model is also more applicable in Japan than it is in the U.S. but 
that it is not of dominant importance even in Japan, and conversely, that the altruism model is far more 
applicable in the U.S. than it is in Japan.  Those who believe that the Japanese are more altruistic than 
other peoples (such as Hayashi (1986)) appear to be mistaken. 
 
12. Policy Implications 
 Last but not least, I discuss the policy implications of my findings.  As discussed in greater detail 
by Barro (1974), Weil (1989), Masson and Pestieau (1997), and others, the policy implications of the three 
models of household behavior analyzed in this paper vary dramatically, with very different implications 
concerning (1) the effects of fiscal policy and (2) the effects of bequests on intra-family and social 
inequality.  In this section, I discuss each of these in turn. 
  
12.1. The Effects of Fiscal Policy 
In the case of the life cycle and dynasty models, a tax cut that is financed by the issuance of 
long-term government bonds will have a positive impact on current consumption because the current 
generation will not care about the tax increase the government will have to impose on future generations in 
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order to redeem its bonds.16  In the case of the altruism model, by contrast, a tax cut that is financed by the 
issuance of long-term government bonds will have no impact on current consumption because the current 
generation will save the entire tax cut and use it to increase its bequest to future generations in order to 
compensate them for the increased tax burden they will have to bear (usually referred to as Ricardian 
equivalence).  Thus, Ricardian equivalence will hold in the case of the altruism model but not in the case 
of the life cycle and dynasty models.17  
Similarly, the impact on household saving of raising the benefit levels of a pay-as-you-go public 
pension system will be very different depending on whether the selfish life cycle model, the altruism 
model, or the dynasty model applies, as discussed in subsection 10.3 above. 
  
12.2. The Effects of Bequests on Intra-family and Social Inequality  
According to the selfish life cycle model, individuals either do not leave bequests, leave only 
unintended bequests, or leave only bequests that are a quid pro quo for financial support and/or care during 
old age.  In the latter case, the value of the bequest will presumably roughly coincide with the value of the 
financial support and/or care during old age and thus net bequests (gross bequests net of intergenerational 
transfers in the opposite direction) will be roughly zero.  Thus, in the case of the selfish life cycle model, 
bequests will not exacerbate or perpetuate wealth disparities. 
By contrast, in the case of the altruism and dynasty models, bequests will be unrequited and thus 
even net bequests will be positive.  In the case of the altruism model, bequests will equalize the 
distribution of wealth among siblings because they are compensatory, but at the same time, they will 
exacerbate and perpetuate social (inter-family) wealth disparities.  In the case of the dynasty model, by 
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contrast, bequests will cause the distribution of wealth among siblings to become more unequal because 
the entire bequest goes to the child who carries on the family line and/or the family business, but they may, 
at the same time, reduce steady-state social inequality by facilitating the upward mobility of the child who 
receives the entire bequest (see Chu (1991)). 
  
12.3. Summary 
To the extent that the Japanese adhere to the selfish life cycle model, a tax cut that is financed by 
the issuance of long-term government bonds will have a positive impact on current consumption, an 
increase in public pension benefits will cause a decline in household saving, and bequests will not cause 
wealth inequalities to be passed on from generation to generation.  However, these implications need to be 
moderated to the extent that a sizable minority of the Japanese adhere to the altruism model. 
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Model Assumption Bequest Motives Bequest Division
Life Cycle Model Individuals are selfish Leave no bequest, leave Leave all to the child who
only unintended bequests, or provides financial support
leave bequest only if children or care during old age
provide financial support  
and/or care during old age
Altruism Model Individuals harbor inter- Leave unconditional bequest Divide one's bequest among 
generational altruism toward (or no bequest) one's children and, in 
their children particular, leave more to the
child who has less earning
power or  greater needs
Dynasty (or Individuals care about the Leave bequest only if children Leave all to the child who
Lineal) Model perpetuation of the family carry on the family line or carries on the family line or
line or the family business the family business the family business
Table 1: Summary of the Three Models of Household Behavior
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) Life Cycle Altruism Number of
Received Uncondi- Conditional Didn't Receive Model Model Observations
Bequest tional on Care Bequest (3)+(4) (2)
1990 40.19 13.54 26.66 59.81 86.46 13.54 622
1992 37.25 18.47 18.77 62.75 81.53 18.47 698
1994 34.74 - - 65.26 - - 898
1996 39.61 - - 60.39 - - 982
Source: SFACH
Table 2: The Strength and Nature of the Respondents' Parents' Bequest Motive
 43
 
 
 
 
 
Survey, Intended Unintended Intended or Unin- No Other Number of
Year, and Bequests Bequests tended Bequests Bequests Observations
Country
Public Opinion Survey on Saving
1989 52.75 - 52.75 33.70 13.56 4146
1990 54.22 - 54.22 32.61 13.17 3379
Survey on the Financial Asset Choice of Households
1992 51.98 - 51.98 40.79 7.23 3788
1994 23.94 49.75 73.69 24.55 1.75 3763
1996 25.78 47.49 73.27 24.16 2.56 3588
1998 26.19 47.31 73.50 24.92 1.58 3158
2001 24.12 46.06 70.18 27.33 2.49 3055
Comparative Survey of Savings in Japan and the United States (1996)
Japan 25.67 69.33 95.00 5.00 - 1001
U.S. 45.94 51.13 97.07 2.93 - 1058
No Bequests: (6)
Other: (5)
Table 3: The Strength of the Respondents' Bequest Motive
Source: Table 4 
Intended Bequests: (1)+(2)+(3)
Unintended Bequests: (4)
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Survey, (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (6a) (6b) Life Cycle Altruism Dynasty Number of
Year, and Model Model Model Observations
Country (2)+(4)+(6a) (1)+(6b) (3)
Public Opinion Survey on Saving
1989 32.61 20.14 - - 13.56 33.69 23.61 10.08 91.00 42.69 - 4146
1990 34.98 19.24 - - 13.17 32.61 23.14 9.47 88.16 44.45 - 3379
Survey on the Financial Asset Choice of Households
1992 27.61 24.37 - - 7.23 40.79 - - 65.15 27.61 - 3788
1994 17.14 6.80 - 49.75 1.75 24.55 - - 81.11 17.14 - 3763
1996 18.09 6.16 1.53 47.49 2.56 24.16 - - 77.81 18.09 1.53 3588
1998 19.89 5.00 1.30 47.31 1.58 24.92 - - 77.23 19.89 1.30 3158
2001 17.61 4.94 1.57 46.06 2.49 27.33 - - 78.33 17.61 1.57 3055
Comparative Survey of Savings in Japan and the United States (1996)
Japan 19.28 6.39 - 69.33 - 5.00 - - 80.72 19.28 - 1001
U.S. 42.53 3.40 - 51.13 - 2.93 - - 57.47 42.53 - 1058
(5) Other
the will to work
Note: In cases in which a breakdown of (6) is not available, everyone selecting (6) was assumed to be of type (6a).
(6b) Do not plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or children because the expectation of receiving a bequest might cause him/her/them to lose 
(3) Plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or children only if my/our child or children take over the family business
(6a) Do not plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or children because I/we want to enjoy my/our own lives
Table 4: The Nature of the Respondents' Bequest Motive
(1) Plan to leave a bequest to my/our child or children no matter what
(6) Do not feel it is necessary to leave a bequest to my/our child or children under any circumstances
(2) Plan to leave a bequest to my/our child for children only if my/our child or children take care of me/us
(4) Do not plan to make any special efforts to leave a bequest to my/our child or children but will leave behind whatever happens to be left over
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Year and (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Life Cycle Altruism Dynasty Number of
Category Model Model Model Observations
(2)+(7) (1)+(4) (3)+(5)
1998
Head's parents 34.29 26.44 9.39 0.38 5.94 9.96 13.60 40.04 34.67 15.33 522
Spouse's parents 37.43 24.27 6.73 1.75 4.68 10.23 14.91 39.18 39.18 11.40 342
2001
Head's parents 28.04 32.43 13.85 0.51 10.64 11.66 2.87 35.30 28.55 24.49 592
Spouse's parents 29.62 25.09 12.20 0.00 9.06 15.68 8.36 33.45 29.62 21.25 287
(6) Other
Source: SFACH
(3) More or all to the child or children who took over the family business
(5) More or all to the eldest son/daughter even though he/she did not take care of the parents
Table 5: The Division of the Respondents' Parents' Bequest
(7) No bequests left
(2) More or all to the child or children who took care of the parents
(1) Divided equally
(4) More or all to the child or children who had less income
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Survey, (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) Life Cycle Altruism Dynasty Number of
Year, and Model Model Model Observations
Country (2)+(7) (1)+(4) (3)+(5)
Survey on the Financial Asset Choice of Households
1994 34.00 18.95 3.14 1.26 13.27 4.83 24.55 43.50 35.25 16.41 3763
1996 38.21 24.10 3.66 0.93 5.02 3.92 24.16 48.26 39.14 8.68 3588
1998 42.75 21.91 2.62 0.70 3.46 3.64 24.92 46.83 43.45 6.07 3158
2001 36.15 21.12 3.47 0.74 6.30 4.88 27.33 48.46 36.89 9.77 3055
Comparative Survey of Savings in Japan and the United States (1996)
Japan 44.17 29.21 5.73 1.75 7.71 6.43 5.00 34.21 45.92 13.44 1001
U.S. 84.10 3.09 0.41 0.41 2.16 6.90 2.93 6.02 84.51 2.57 1058
(6) Other
Table 6: The Respondents' Attitude toward Bequest Division
(4) Give more or all to the child or children who has less income
(5) Give more or all to the eldest son/daughter even if he/she does not take care of me/us
(7) Do not feel it is necessary to leave a bequest to my/our child or children under any circumstances.
(2) Give more or all to the child or children who take care of me/us
(1) Divide equally
(3) Give more or all to the child or children who take over the family business
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Criterion Year and Life Cycle Altruism Dynasty
Country Model Model Model
Parents' bequest motive 1990 86.46 13.54 -
1992 91.53 18.47 -
Respondents' bequest motive 1994 81.11 17.14 -
1996 77.81 18.09 1.53
1998 77.23 19.89 1.30
2001 78.33 17.61 1.57
Japan 80.72 19.28 -
U.S. 57.47 42.53 -
Division of respondents' parents' bequest 1998 40.04 34.67 15.33
2001 35.30 28.55 24.49
Division of respondents' spouse's parents' bequest 1998 39.18 39.18 11.40
2001 33.45 29.62 21.25
Respondents' attitude toward bequest division 1996 48.26 39.14 8.68
1998 46.83 43.45 6.07
2001 48.46 36.89 9.77
Japan 34.21 45.92 13.44
U.S. 6.02 84.51 2.57
Source: Tables 2-6
Table 7: The Applicability of Various Models of Household Behavior
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Category
1998 2001
Respondent's parents 88.62 86.37
Respondent's spouse's parents 84.83 84.38
Respondent's children 91.59 91.86
Respondent's siblings 61.59 60.30
Friends - 19.43
Acquaintances 11.24 -
Disaster victims - 49.34
Strangers 1.56 -
Number of observations 3754 3111
Source: SFACH
Note: These proportions show the ratio of the number of respondents 
willing to help each category of individual to the number of respondents w
have at least one individual in that category.
Year
Table 8: Willingness to Help Others 
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Footnotes 
                                                   
1 This model is often referred to as the “dynasty model,” but I use this term to refer to a different model (see (3) 
below). 
 
2 Another formulation is to assume that parents derive utility from the amount of the bequest itself, but I 
will not discuss this formulation in detail because I find it to be a bit ad hoc.  This model is sometimes 
referred to as the “joy of giving,” “bequest per se,” “bequest as consumption,” or “warm glow” model.  
See Yaari (1964, 1965) and Andreoni (1989).  
 
3 Transfers from parents to children include education- and marriage-related expenses, assistance with 
housing purchase, etc. 
 
4 One other practice—sentei souzoku (selective inheritance), whereby the parents or siblings selected the 
heir from among a number of candidates—was relatively rare and hence will not be discussed here. 
 
5 Note that individual households may have been highly constrained in their bequest behavior by the legal 
and social norms that prevailed at the time and place where they lived but that those legal and social norms 
were developed by the Japanese themselves and hence were presumably influenced by their inherent 
nature (i.e., by whether they are selfish, altruistic, or dynastic).  I am indebted to Colin McKenzie and Ken 
Yamada for this point. 
   
6 A supplementary sample of 500 aged households was surveyed in 1988-1996 but is not included in the 
tabulations. 
 
7 The proportion of respondents who received bequests from their parents may be so low partly because 
the prewar custom of male primogeniture is still relatively prevalent in Japan, as a result of which younger 
siblings often do not receive bequests, and because living standards were so low at the time the parents of 
those currently 60 and older were in the prime, as a result of which they could not afford to leave a bequest 
to their children, but these factors do not explain why the proportion of respondents planning to leave 
bequests is so low (see subsection 4.2). 
 
8 To be perfectly correct, the sample should be confined to those with one or more living children in the 
analysis in this subsection and in subsection 6.2 inasmuch as those with no living children do not have the 
option of leaving a bequest to their children.   I confine the sample in this way in Horioka et al. (1998, 2000, 
and 2001), but the results are not significantly affected. 
 
9 As noted above, this motive is consistent with the altruism model if the reason for not leaving a bequest 
is so that the expectation of receiving a bequest will not cause one’s child or children to lose the will to 
work, but because a breakdown by reason is not available, I have assumed that everyone selecting this 
motive is selfishly motivated. 
 
10 To be perfectly correct, the sample should be confined to those with two or more living children in the 
analysis in this subsection inasmuch as one needs to decide how to divide one’s bequest among one’s 
children only if one has two or more living children.  I confine the sample in this way in Horioka et al. 
(1998, 2000, 2001), but the results are not significantly affected. 
  
11 The U.S. figure is remarkably consistent with Wilhelm’s (1996) finding that 88% of the decedents in his 
sample divided their estates exactly equally or “approximately equally” and is also consistent with Dunn 
and Phillips’s (1997) finding that 90% of the respondents named all of their children as beneficiaries in 
their wills (i.e., planned to leave at least something to every child). 
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12 It could be that the lower incidence of equal division in Japan is due in part to the fact that the share of 
real estate (an indivisible asset) in household portfolios is much higher in Japan than it is in the U.S.  I am 
indebted to Masashi Nishikawa for this point. 
 
13 However, in order to make this argument more convincing, I need to explain why individuals do not free 
ride.  I am indebted to Kiminori Matsuyama for this point. 
 
14 See also Ohtake (1991). 
 
15 See also Horioka and Okui (1999) and Wakabayashi (2001). 
 
16 In the case of the dynasty model, the current generation will care about the child who carries on the 
family line or the family business but will not care about any of its other children (see Weil (1989)). 
 
17 Note, however, that Ricardian equivalence will not hold if intergenerational transfers are in the form of 
human capital (such as investment in education) (see Drazen (1978)) and that it will not necessarily hold if 
altruism is two-sided (see Kimball (1987)). 
